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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JEAl'lliETTE U. SWAN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB

vs.
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and
DR. DENNIS D. THOEN,

Case No. 14823

Defendants and
Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for alleged malpractice committed by the defendants in the performance of certain
diagnostic procedures and surgery upon the back of the
plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury upon the
theory of lack of informed consent, and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of both defendants and against the plaintiff,
no cause of action.

Judgment was entered in favor of the

defendants on the verdict.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek an affirmance of the judgment
below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The pages of the transcript of the trial proceedings
are not consecutively numbered.

The pages of the transcript

of each day of the trial are separately numbered.

Therefore,

in referring to the transcript of trial proceedings, we
shall designate the day by a Roman numeral and the page by
Arabic numerals, e. g. a citation to the first day of trial
page 18 would be as follows: (Tr. I, p. 18.)
THE FACTS
The statement of facts contained in plaintiff's
brief is not complete and is somewhat misleading; and we
deem it necessary to supplement plaintiff's statement as
follows:
At the time plaintiff came under the care of
defendants here, she was 68 years of age.

In her early 40's

she first experienced problems with her back. (Tr. IV, P·
82.)

This ultimately resulted in surgery which was performed

in New York City in 1953. (Tr. I, p. 62; IV, p. 68.)
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Following

l

the surgery she enjoyed a good recovery and for a period of
several years was symptom free. However, for several years
before the date of the surgery giving rise to this case she
had experienced increasingly severe back symptoms.

(Tr. I,

p. 62; IV, pp. 68, 95.)
Her family physician was Dr. Robert Dalrymple, an
internist.

She was under treatment from him for high blood

pressure and other medical problems.

In March 1971, she

complained to him of pains in her back.

She made the same

complaint in May of '71, and in August of 1972 she complained
of low back pain and pain in the right lower extremity. (Tr.
I, p. 32; IV, p. 67.)

This was severe.

Dr. Dalrymple

recommended bed rest which is a form of conservative therapy.
(Tr. I, p. 58.)
1972.

He examined her again on September 12,

At that time she had severe pain in the low back and

right leg.

(Tr. IV, p. 92.)

He concluded that she was sick

enough to be put in the hospital for definitive diagnosis
and treatment.
the same day.

She was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital on
(Ex. lP; Tr. I, pp. 27, 29, 33-34, 60, 62,

65.) At that time she had a lot of pain and spasm in her

back and severe disease of the back, which was progressive.
In his mind there was some question of spinal cord damage.
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(Tr. I, pp. 34, 47, 60, 62-64.)

He referred her to

Dr. Robert Lamb, orthopedist, for definitive care.

defe~c:

Dr.

L~

enlisted the assistance of defendant Dr. Dennis Thoen, a
neurologist, in the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff.
(Tr. II, p. 90; III, p. 10.)
After defendant doctors took plaintiff's history
and performed a series of diagnostic tests and procedures,
including a myelogram, they concluded that plaintiff's only
hope for improvement was surgery.

She had experienced socre

aggravation of her symptons following the myelogram. (Ex. 1-:
Tr. II, pp. 5-11, 21, 81-82, 86, 90-93, 113-114, 117; III.
pp. 10-21, 46, 68-71.)

There were risks inherent in both

the myelogram and the surgery, but if she did not have the
surgery she would follow a progressively downhill course
with increasing symptoms and disabilities as time progressec
(Tr. II, pp. 94; III, pp. 46, 68-71.)

According to their

testimonies, apparently believed by the jury, both defendan:;
warned plaintiff and her husband that there were hazards
the procedures.

(Tr. II, pp. 17, 21, 23, 94-95; III, PP·

22, 24, 70-71, 76, 97.)
A spinal decompression surgical procedure was
performed by Dr. Lamb, following which plai~tiff became
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i:;

2

>

paraplegic, for which injuries the present suit was brought.
Plaintiff proceeded on two theories:

(1) failure of defendant

doctors to treat plaintiff in accordance with the standard
of care prevailing in the community; and (2) failure to
obtain the informed consent of the plaintiff to the procedures
which they performed.

(R. 2-5.)

Plaintiff's family physician,

Dr. Dalrymple, testified that he did not know of anything
done or omitted to be done by defendant doctors which would
be a departure from the standard of care prevailing in this
community, and that he was familiar with the standard of
care of orthopedic surgeons in the C0111IlUility.

(Tr. I, pp.

68-69.)
In order to prove the standard of care in this
community, plaintiff offered as an expert witness Dr. Peter
Rocovich of Los Angeles, California. (Tr. III, p. 100.)
~ocovich

Dr.

was a member of the Southern California Neurosurgical

Society, American

~edical

College [Association], California

~edical

Association, Los Angeles County Medical Association,

~estern

States Federation of Neurological Sciences. (Tr.

III, p. 102.)

It will be noted that he was not a member of

a single professional organization which was national in
scope except the American Medical [Association.].

That is
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not a specialty association, and admission is to all physicia:..
in good standing in their profession, regardless of trainin g,
experience, specialty, or competence.
It is of particular importance that Dr. Rocovich
had taken and "flunked" the board examinations in his own
specialty, and therefore was not, and could not be board
certified.

(Tr. III, p. 103; IV, p. 21.)

Moreover, he did

not belong to any nationally recognized professional associati::
dealing with his specialty such as the Harvey Cushing Society,
American College of Surgeons, American Academy of Neurosurgeon:
and similar organizations.

(Tr. IV, p. 22.)

Apart from the

American Medical Association, the only society he belonged
to which was more than purely local in scope was the Western
States Federation of Neurological Sciences.

There was no

evidence that any particular qualifications were necessary
to obtain membership in that organization.
By way of offer of proof, counsel for the defendant>
established without contradiction, that Dr. Rocovich had
never attended medical school in the State of Utah, had
never taken any medical classes in the State of Utah, had
not attended any medical lectures or seminars in the State
of Utah, had no personal knowledge of the medical school at
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the University of Utah, had never been licensed to practice
in the State of Utah, had never undertaken to practice in
the State of Utah, had never performed a surgical procedure
in the State of Utah, had never "scrubbed in" at a Utah
hospital with a Utah doctor to observe him perform surgery,
had never observed a spinal decompression being done in the
State of Utah, and had no personal knowledge concerning the
standards of practice of medicine in this state.

(Tr. IV,

pp. 20-21.)
There was no indication that he had ever repeated
and passed the national board examination, or that he had
ever remedied the deficiencies which had caused him to fail
the initial examination.

Not being board certified, he, of

course, did not receive the publications of the speciality
board of his own speciality.

(Tr. IV, p.21.)

He had absolutely no specialty training in orthopedic surgery and did not subscribe to any orthopedic surgery
periodicals. There are differences in practice between
orthopedic surgeons and neurosurgeons in the field of spinal
surgery.

(Tr. IV, p. 22.)
Dr. Rocovich admitted that he spends a substantial

amount of his time in court testifying.

He spent the entire

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 7 -

week of trial in Salt Lake City in connection with this
case. He has testified in Utah before and has testified in
Arizona on one or two occasions.

He has testified on several

occasions for attorney David Harney of Los Angeles, a specialii:
in medical malpractice litigation.

He also has a business

relationship with attorney Harney. (Tr. IV, pp. 54-55.)

He

has previously testified at the request of the attorney for
the plaintiff in this case in another case in Utah.

In that

case, he undertook to testify as to the standard of care of
a hospital in the State of Utah.
days on that occasion.

He was in Utah for several

(Tr. IV, pp. 58-59.)

After considerable discussion·, consideration and
debate, the trial judge determined not to accept the proffered
testimony of Dr. Rocovich as to the standard of care in
Utah. The judge set forth the reasons for his decision in a
rather lengthy and thoughtful statement.
6 and 10-12.

See Tr. IV, PP· 3-

Judge Croft indicated that Dr. Rocovich had

failed to establish to his satisfaction, familiarity with
the degree of care and skill of other p~actitioners in the
locality of Utah sufficient to qualify him to testify as to
the standard of care of physicians in this state.

(Tr. IV,

p. 6.)
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Dr. Robert Lamb is a specialist in orthopedic
surgery. He is board certified and has been since 1953. He
is also a member of the American Academy of Orthopedic
Surgeons and a fellow of the American College of Surgeons.
To become board certified it was necessary for him to pass
both written and oral examinations.

(Tr. II, pp. 2, 78.)

Defendant, Dr. Thoen is likewise board certified
in his speciality of neurology.

As with Dr. Lamb, he obtained

certification by taking and passing both written and oral
examinations.

(Tr. III, pp. 65-66.)

Plaintiff offered no evidence other than the
testimony of Dr. Rocovich concerning the alleged departure
from the standard of care by the defendant doctors.

Since

the proffered testimony was not received, the court, of
necessity, directed a verdict in favor of both defendants
and against the plaintiff on the issue of defendants'
negligence in the care and treatment of the plaintiff.

The

case was submitted to the jury on the single issue of whether
plaintiff had given an informed consent to the diagnostic
and surgical procedures which were performed upon her.

Upon

that issue, the jury found in favor of the defendants and
returned a verdict in their favor, upon which judgment was
entered.

This appeal followed.
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ARGUMENT
The single issue before this court is whether the
trial judge erred, or abused his discretion, in refusing to
receive the proffered expert testimony of Dr. Peter Rocovich
as to the standard of care by the defendant doctors in this
case.
However, plaintiff has somewhat fragmented her
argument and in order to meet squarely the issues which she
has raised, we have subdivided our argument.

POINT I. THE LOCALITY RULE IS THE WELL
ESTABLISHED RULE OF DECISION IN THIS COURT AND
SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED NOW
Plaintiff opens her brief with a general discussion
of the various standards which have been applied in evaluatini
the skill and care of defendant physicians in malpractice
cases. She then reviews the applicable Utah decisions and
concludes that Utah has never committed itself to any of the
four rules enumerated, namely the strict locality rule, the
general neighborhood rule, the similar locality rule or the
national standards rule.

While it may be that the question

has never been presented to the court quite as pointedly as
it is here, the innumerable holdings of this court clearly
demonstrate that this State is thoroughly cornmitted to the
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locality rule.

There may be some loose expressions in some

of the cases referring to "the same or similar locality."
For purposes of this case, we do not regard it as important
whether the "strict locality," or "same or similar locality"
rule is held to be applicable.
Plaintiff then launches on a diatribe on the
locality rule, describing it as "archaic", "outmoded,"
"unjust," and without any reason in fact.

In support of her

position plaintiff relies inter alia upon reports, surveys
and other materials never offered or received in evidence,
and not properly before the Court.
We cannot agree with plaintiff that the locality
rule has outlived its usefulness or vitality in the year
1977, particularly in the western part of the United States.
It cannot be denied that the doctors practicing in rural
areas do not have the same advantages, and therefore, should
not be held to the same standard of care, as doctors practicing
in the urban centers. For example, doctors in the urban
centers have ready access to consultation by specialists in
the whole gamut of medical specialties.

They have access to

sophisticated diagnostic equipment, and to consultations by
experienced specialists in all fields.

They have access to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 11 -

fast ambulance service, superior hospital facilities and
extensive medical libraries. Rural doctors do not have the
freedom to leave their practices in isolated communities for
extended periods of time to attend seminars and

supplementa~

training sessions. In many communities there is but one
doctor, and when he is absent from the town there is no
medical help available.
Many recent decisions have reaffirmed the locality
rule. See for example Lockart v. Maclean, (Nev.), 361P.2d
670; Murphy v. Dyer, (10th Cir.), 409 F.2d 747; McCay
v. Mitchell, (Tenn. App.) , 463 S. W. 2d 710; Burley v. Williams
189 Neb. 484, 203 N.W.2d 454; Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M.
161, 509 P.2d 1356; Goedecke v. Price, 19 Ariz. App. 320,
506 P.2d 1105.

A recent case from the Supreme Court of

Arkansas gave thoughtful consideration to the entire problem,
and we quote from it at length.
(Ark.), 531 S. W. 2d 945.

See Gambill v. Stroud,

The following quotations are pertiner.:

here:
"The thrust of appellants' argument is that
the rule set out in AMI 1501 is no longer
applicable to modern medicine, because
doctors practicing in small conununities
now have the same opportunities and
resources as physicians in large cities
to keep abreast of advances in the medical
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 12 -

L

profession, due to availability of the
Journal of the American Medical Association and other journals, drug company
representatives and literature, closed
circuit television, special radio networks,
tape recorded digests of medical literature, medical seminars and opportunities
for exchange of views between doctors from
small towns and those from large cities
where there are complexes of medical centers
and modern facilities.
"However desirable the attainment of this
ideal may be, it remains an ideal. It was
not shown in this case, and we are not
convinced, that we have reached the time
when the same postgraduate medical education, research and experience is equally
available to all physicians, regardless of
the community in which they practice. The
opportunities for doctors in small towns, of
which we have many, to leave a demanding
practice to attend seminars and regional
medical meetings cannot be the same as those
for doctors practicing in clinics in large
centers. It goes without saying that the
physicians in these small towns do not and
cannot have the clinical and hospital
facilities available in the larger cities
where there are large, modern hospitals, and
medical centers or the same advantage of
observing others who have been trained, or
have developed expertise, in the use of new
skills, facilities and procedures, of
consulting and exchanging views with specialists, other practitioners and drug experts,
of utilizing closed circuit television,
special radio networks or of studying in
extensive medical libraries found in larger
centers.
"The rule we have established is not a strict
locality rule. It incorporates the similar
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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community into the picture. The standard
is not limited to that of a particular locality. Rather, it is that of persons engaged
in a similar practice in similar localities
giving consideration to geographical location
size and character of the community. Restate~ent
of the Law, Torts 2d, 75 Comment g, §299A.
The similarity of communities should depend not
on population or area in a medical malpractice
case, but rather upon their similarity from
the standpoint of medical facilities, practices
and advantages . . . .
"Modern means of transportation and connnunication
have extended boundaries but they have not
eliminated them. See Sinz v. Owens, supra;
Tvedt v. Haugen 70 N. D. 338, 294 N.W. 183,
132 A.L.R. 379 (1940). The opportunities
available to practitioners in a comm.unity are
certainly matters of fact and not law and may
be shown by evidence under our own locality rule.
"Our locality rule is well expressed in Restatement
of the Law, Torts 2d (1965) 73, §299A, viz:
Unless he represents that he has greater
or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of
a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally
possessed by members of that profession or
trade in good standing in similar cormnunities.
"It is fallacious to say that our locality ru~e
permits a doctor in one place to be more negllg~
than one in another place. It is a matter of
skill that he is expected to possess, i.e., ~he
skill possessed and used by the members of his
profession in good standing, engaged in the same
type of practice in the locality in whic~ ~e
practices, or a similar locality. The similar. 'ans
locality rule pr even ts highly incompetent physici
in a particular town from setting a standard of
utter inferiority for the practice of medicine
there . . . .
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"One of the ideas suggested in appellants' argument
is that a national standard of care should be
observed. This is also unrealistic. We cannot
accept that premise as a matter of law and we
certainly do not take the theory that such a
standard exists to be so well established that it can
be judicially noticed. If it does factually exist,
to any extent, or in any case, then certainly it
can be shown by evidence. If the medical profession
recognizes that there are standard treatments
which should be utilized nation-wide this fact
should be readily susceptible of proof under
the similar locality rule because the skill and
learning should be the same and all localities
would be similar. See Annot, 37 A.L.R.3d 420,
425; Peters v. Gelb, 303 A.2d 685 (Del. Super.
1973); Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hospital,
Inc., 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974);
HUndley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d
159 (1967). The same may be said for any region
exceeding the boundaries of a particular city or
town . . . .

*

*

*

*

*

"It is also suggested that modern transportation
and communications have so extended the borders
of the locality as to bring the physician in
a smaller community within the boundaries of a
larger community where the appropriate treatment
may be assured to a patient, even though the
physician in the small town be unable to give it
because of limited facilities or training. Here
again, the appropriate community standard may
require that these doctors send such patients as
may be taken to such larger centers, but when
this is not practicable, the small town doctor
should not be penalized for not utilizing means
or facilities not reasonably available to him."
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff complains that the locality rule is unfair
and that it is impossible for plaintiffs to obtain the
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testimony of local doctors in support of their claims even
where meritorious.

This is based on decisions from other

jurisdictions, and reports and surveys from other times.
Whatever the situation may be elsewhere in this country, and
whatever it may have been in other times, it cannot be
realistically contended that today, at least in the State of
Utah, that a plaintiff cannot obtain the testimony of a
properly qualified physician, familiar with the local standarc
of care, to testify in support of a meritorious malpractice
claim.
Just one year ago the legislature of this state
determined that there was a "crisis" in malpractice litigatioi
in this state, and found it necessary in a Budget Session
to enact a Health Care Malpractice Act.

As the basis for

the act, the legislature determined:
"The legislature finds and declares that
the number of suits and claims for damages
and the amount of judgments and settlements
arising from health care has increased great_1Y .
in recent years." Sec. 78-14-2, U.C.A. (Emphasis
added.)
If plaintiffs generally were having any substantial

· f in
· d ing
·
·
to support meritorious
expert tes t imony
d i·ff·icu 1 ty in
claims one must wonder why it was necessary for the
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l

eg

islatura

j

·

almost as an emergency measure, to enact a malpractice act
and to make the findings quoted above.
Plaintiff places great reliance on the case of
Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash.2d 476, 438 P.2d 829.

In a

stinging dissenting opinion in that case Justice Rosellini said:
"Furthermore, I do not think that a plaintiff's
attorney need be unduly handicapped by lack of
information in testing the expertise of a
medical witness. Medical knowledge has been
written down and is accessible to the lawyer.
If he confronts the witness with this knowledge
I rather doubt that the doctor would allow his
reluctance to incriminate a colleague to overcome his concern for his own reputation as a
man competent in his field and so profess
ignorance of matters which reasonable competence would require him to know."
At page 31 of appellant's brief it is said as follows:
"This court cannot, without believing that Utah
standards are justifiably lower than those of
other states, countenance the application of a
same general neighborhood rule in such a
way as to affirm the lower court's decision
to reject testimony from Dr. Rocovich."
We emphatically disagree with this statement.
It is not that Utah standards are lower than those of
other states, but that they are higher than those demonstrated
by Dr. Rocovich (as we shall hereafter more fully demonstrate)

that makes the ruling of the lower court eminently correct.
Appellant argues in opposition to the locality
rule, that, "Close collegial relationships develop as doctors
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attend the same seminars, conferences and symposia, belong
to the same organizations.
page 32.

. . " etc.

See appellant's brief

The same argument could be advanced against a

national standards rule with equal force.

Board certified

physicians in all of the specialities regularly attain and
maintain collegial relationships, attend the same seminars,
conferences and symposia, belong to the same organizations,
etc. If this is a valid argument, it is a valid argument
against a national standards rule as well as against a
locality rule.
In Blye v. Rhodes, (Va.) 222 S.E.2d 783, plaintiff's
counsel made the same appeal as is being made here for an
abandonment of the locality rule and adoption of a national
standards rule.

In rejecting that argument the Virginia Court
I

I

said at pp. 788-789:
"We acknowledge, as the plaintiff points out,
that changes in communication, education, and
attitudes have resulted in the abandonment
by some jurisdictions of locality standards
in favor of a national standard for determining
medical malpractice of specialists. And we
cannot deny the apparent merit of the argum~nts
favoring change to a national standard applicable
to specialists.
"We are firmly of the view, however, that such
a material change in the substantive law of
Virginia should not be accomplished by the mere
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_J

brush of the judicial pen. The Virginia (same
or similar community) standard is imbedded in
the jurisprudential law of this Commonwealth;
it has been long relied upon by lower courts,
the legal and medical professions, and the
public. If for no other reason, we reject the
challenge for change because basic concepts
of stare decisis dictate maintenance of the
established law.
"Sound considerations of policy also militate
against a bench change of the present law.
We have noted in Part I the critical national
situation caused by proliferating medical
malpractice litigation. If any changes in the
substantive rules applicable to such litigation
are to be made midstream of the controversy, the
legislature and not this court should be the
recipient of the pleas for change.
"
(Emphasis added.)
Within the last year the Utah legislature has
considered and legislated on this subject.

Since it did not

see fit to alter the present, well established locality
rule, this court should not do so.
POINT II. UNDER ANY STANDARD, DR. ROCOVICH
DEMONSTRATED NO QUALIFICATIONS TO TESTIFY
AGAINST DEFENDANT DOCTORS IN THIS CASE
Even under a national standards rule, Dr. Rocovich
demonstrated no qualifications to testify as an expert
concerning the professional conduct of Dr. Lamb and Dr.
Thoen.

As we have previously demonstrated, Dr. Rocovich was

not board certified in his own speciality, neurosurgery,
much less in the specialities of the defendant doctors.
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He

did not belong to any national associations which had merit
or specialty qualifications for membership.

There is no

showing that he subscribed to the publications of the nationa:
speciality societies.

In fact, it is affirmatively shown

that Dr. Rocovich was not able to pass the test necessary
for certification as a specialist in his own field.

How, the:

can he be qualified to testify as against the defendants in
this case who are specialists in different fields?

The very

argument which plaintiff makes for a national standards
rule, wholly defeats any claim that Dr. Rocovich was qualifiec
to testify against the defendants in this case.
As heretofore noted, this is not the first time
that Dr. Rocovich has been offered as an expert in this
state to testify on medical matters not involving his own
speciality.

In the case of Johnson v. L.D.S. Hospital, :lo.

12970, Dr. Rocovich testified as an expert as to the standard
of care of one of the local hospitals.

That case was appealed

to this court but pending appeal was settled between the
parties.

However, briefs were filed and an examination of

them will show that the same Dr. Rocovich was offere d bY the '
same attorney in that case as presently represents the
appellant here.
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J

I

Plaintiff relies upon the case of Kronke v. Danielson,
108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156.
Rocovich.

That case also involved Dr.

That fact does not appear from the report of the

case in Kronke, but reference to the case of Hoeffel v.
Campbell, (Ariz. App.), 494 P.2d 777 will demonstrate that
again the same Dr. Peter Rocovich is involved.

In Kronke

the court said:
"To qualify an expert to express an opinion
on what that standard of care is for the
speciality of the defendant, the party
offering the witness must establish the
witness' knowledge and familiarity with
the standard of care and treatment commonly
practiced by physicians engaged in the same
type of speciality as the defendant."
On page 46 of her brief, appellant says:
"As was stated by one court, 'A defendant
should not be judged by a lower standard
than he himself requests."
We emphatically agree with this.
what the defendants ask in this case.

This is exactly

Dr. Lamb, a board

certified orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Thoen, a board certified
neurologist, should not be judged by the standards of a
neurosurgeon who has flunked the certifying examination in
his own specialty and who has demonstrated no knowledge
whatsoever concerning the practice or standards in the State
of Utah.

Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case wherein
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a doctor who is not board certified in his own speciality
has been allowed to testify as to the standard of care or
qualifications of a defendant who is board certified in a
different speciality.
face.

The situation is ludicrous on its

We submit that no such condition should ever be

permitted to exist.

Dr. Rocovich was wholly unqualified to

testify as against these defendants and the court properly
rejected his testimony.

POINT III. THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS WIDE DISCRETION
AS TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF AN EXPERT WITNESS
The trial court has discretion in the first instance
to determine the qualifications of a proffered expert and in
the absence of abuse of discretion his ruling will not be
reversed.

Plaintiff relies on the case of Riley v. Layton,

(10th Cir.), 329 F. 2d 53, wherein a decision by Judge Ritter

I

· · el
to receive the testimony of a San Francisco general practition.1
I
to testify as to the standard of care of a doctor practicing '
in Kanab, Utah was affirmed.

The basis of the appellate court';

ruling, however, was that the testifying expert demonstrated
some knowledge and experience of the methods of practice in
similar localities, and that in the absence of a showing..Ei
abuse of discretion in ruling on the qualifications of~
expert to testify, the ruling of the trial judge
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would~

l

disturbed.

In a later case, more like the case at bar,

the same court sustained the ruling of a trial judge in
rejecting the testimony of a nationally renowned expert in
anesthesiology, in a case against a local obstetrician, because
there was no showing that he was familiar with the local
standard of care. Murphy v. Dyer, (10th Cir.), 409 F.2d 747.
In Mccay v. Mitchell, et al, (Tenn. App.), 463
S.W.2d 710, the court said at p. 718:
"To qualify an expert witness in a
malpractice action, it must appear he is
familiar with the treatment and care and
skill of practitioners in the locality in
question . . . .
"The qualification of a witness as an
expert is a matter largely within the
determination of the trial court. Appellate
courts will not reverse the ruling of a
trial judge on the issue unless it is shown
the trial judge was clearly in error. Quinley
v. Cocke, supra; McElroy v. State (1921) 146
Tenn. 442, 242 S.W.2d 883. After a careful
review of the rather lengthy and full testimony produced to qualify Dr. Chodoff as an
expert medical witness, we feel the Trial
Judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to allow this witness to testify as to the
standards of care and skill required of
orthopedic surgeons and general practitioners
in Memphis, Tennessee. (Emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
We respectfully suggest that any relaxation of the
traditional locality rule should be undertaken with the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 23 -

utmost caution.

Any such relaxation invites the testimony

1

of foreign quacks and charlatans, who are nothing more than
professional witnesses without either professional qualificaL:
or conscience.

If the doors are to be opened to the testimoni

of professional witnesses from outside the state, to testify
as to the standards of care of local professionals, care
should be taken that such alleged experts are in fact what
they purport to be, and that they do have those professional
qualifications which would qualify them to pass judgment
upon the professional conduct of local physicians.

Such a

showing is completely absent here.
Under the traditional locality rule which this
court has heretofore consistently followed, the testimonyof
Dr. Rocovich was clearly inadmissible.

Even under the most

liberal rule, no proper foundation for the testimony of Dr.
Rocovich was ever laid, and it would be equally inadmissible '
under that rule.

Certainly there has been no showing of an

abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting the
profferred testimony of Dr. Rocovich.

The judgment should

be affirmed.

j

Respectfully submitted,

r!

CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN &

I
By

-----1

Ray R. Christensen D
Attorneys for Respondent r.
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant
and Respondent, Dr. Robert H. Lamb to W. Eugene Hansen, attorney
for Appellant, Hansen & Orton, 2020 Beneficial Life Tower,
36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, and Rex

Hanson, attorney for Respondent Dr. Thoen, Hanson, Wadsworth

& Russon, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
this~~-

84101,

day of June, 1977.
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